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Maritime Terrorism and Legal Responses
DEAN C. ALEXANDER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The specter of terrorism, known since antiquity, continues to
threaten the stability and fabric of modern society in the 1990's.' The
often cited term "terrorism" has yet to find a universally accepted defini-
tion.2 This article will define terrorism as "premeditated, politically moti-
vated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational
groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audi-
ence." Recent events such as the horrific murder of Leon Klinghoffer
LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center(expected 1991); J.D., American Univer-
sity, Washington College of Law; Diplome, Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes In-
ternaitonales, Geneva (thesis in preparation); B.A., Georgetown University. Mr. Alexander is
also the author of The Legal and Economic Impact of the Federal Reserve Board's Ruling
to Allow U.S. Depository Institutions to Accept Foreign Currency Deposits, 14 N.C. J.
INT'L & COMM. REG. 459 (1989); The Export-Import Bank of the United States' War
Against Subsidized Export Credits, 9 DICKINSON J. INT'L L. (1991) (in press).
1. For a synopsis of international terrorism incidents, see Foreign Broadcast Informa-
tion Service, JPRS Report, Terrorism, Nov. 5, 1990, (JPRS-TOT-90-038-L); Loeb, 2 U.S.
Airmen Killed Near Air Base in Philippines, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 14, 1990, at Al;
IRA Takes Blame For Bomb That Injures 6 in London, Wash. Times, May 15, 1990, at A10.
For a history of terrorism, see Bell, Comment: The Origins of Modern Terrorism, 9
TERRORISM: AN INT'L J. 309 (1987) (focusing on terrorism in late 1800's and early 1900's);
THE TERRORISM READER (W. Laquer and Y. Alexander eds. 1987).
For an excellent theoretical and practical analysis of terrorism, see INTERNATIONAL TER-
RORISM: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES (Y. Alexander ed. 1976).
2. An ad hoc United Nations Committee on International Terrorism "was unable to
agree either on the definition of terrorism, its causes, or methods to prevent it." Levitt, The
International Legal Response to Terrorism: A Reevaluation, 50 COLO. L. REv. 533, 537
(1989). See Bennett, United States Initiatives in the United Nations to Combat Interna-
tional Terrorism, 7 INr'L LAW. 752 (1973) (discussing U.S. attempts to formulate definition
of terrorism in U.N.). See also Levitt, Is Terrorism Worth Defining? 13 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
97 (1986). In contrast, in 1985, the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and Treatment of Offenders, passed a Resolution on Criminal Acts of a Terrorist
Character. U.N. Doc. A/CONF 121/L.12/Rev.1 (1985).
3. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM: 1986 at inside front cover
(Jan. 1988). For a definition of international terrorism, see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (1982).
Various U.S. state statutes discuss terrorist acts. See LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TER-
RORISM, 308-19 (Y. Alexander & A. Nanes, eds. 1986); Ludington, Validity and Construction
of Terroristic Threat Statutes, 45 A.L.R. 4th 949, 954-88 (1986); Legal Controls and Deter-
rence of Terrorism: Performance and Prospects, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 465 (1982).
State-sponsored terrorism is defined as: "The deliberate employment of violence or the
threat of use of violence by sovereign states or sub-national groups encouraged or assisted
by sovereign states to attain strategic and political objectives by acts in violation of law.
These criminal acts are intended to create overwhelming fear in a target population larger
than the civilian or military victims attacked or threatened." R. CLINE & Y. ALEXANDER,
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during the seizure of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro underline the
need for practical legal measures to reduce the harmful aspects of this
virus.4
The purpose of this article is manifold. Part II describes the role of
civil suits brought by states and other victims of terrorism. Part III re-
views early international legal responses to maritime terrorism. Part IV
explains the factual background to the Achille Lauro incident and Part V
summarizes the civil suits which followed that incident. Part VI discusses
the rationale and analysis of the Southern District of New York's June
1990 order in the Klinghoffer v. Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
suit, in which the court determined, inter alia, that the federal court had
jurisdiction over the PLO. Part VII assesses the Klinghoffer v. PLO or-
der. Part VIII discusses U.S. legislative proposals to provide U.S. victims
of international terrorism (and their families) a civil cause of action in
U.S. federal district court. Part IX addresses the recent international re-
sponse to maritime terrorism, such as the 1988 I.M.O. Convention, and
Part X concludes that unilateral, bilateral, and multinational legislative
responses are essential to furthering the vital, though slow struggle,
against terrorism.
II. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SUITS BROUGHT BY VICTIMS OF TERRORISM
A. Overview
Professor Harold Koh differentiates between the criminal and civil
responses to terrorism. 5 Prof. Koh notes that criminal sanctions generally
revolve around "the apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of ter-
rorists."6 Furthermore, the criminal paradigm is additionally sub-divided
into four tiers; global conventions, regional agreements, bilateral pacts,
and national legislation.' In contrast, civil responses are subsumed under
"all nonforcible, noncriminal means of sanctioning terrorists and states
who support terrorism."8 Prof. Koh notes that civil remedies are primar-
ily questions of legal rather than political theory, and decried at the lack
TERRORISM AS STATE-SPONSORED COVERT WARFARE 32 (1986).
4. See infra notes 104-122 and accompanying text.
5. Koh, Civil Remedies For Uncivil Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through Transna-
tional Public Law Litigation, 22 TEx. INT'L L.J. 169, 171 (1987).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 173. "The array of possible 'civil' antiterrorist responses run the gamut from
those remedies directed primarily against terrorist individuals and groups to those intended
primarily to sanction their state supporters. Immigration measures and curtailment of travel
rights are prime examples of nonforcible, noncriminal actions targeted against individual
terrorists. A listing of the available nonforcible, noncriminal sanctions against state support-
ers of terrorism, by contrast, encompasses nearly every tool of economic warfare currently
available to nations: denial of import benefits, export controls, financial embargoes and eco-
nomic boycotts, withholding of foreign aid, termination of arms sales, and suspension of air
flights by both official and nongovernmental institutions, to name but a few" (footnotes
ommitted). Id. at 175-77.
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of international framework to compensate victims." Also, Prof. Koh prof-
fers that while criminal prosecution corresponds to deterrence and pun-
ishment, civil sanctions afford monetary and economic benefits to victims
of terrorism."0
Civil remedies to terrorism will ultimately, according to Prof. Koh, be
determined by the following considerations: "[w]hat objectives do the rec-
ognition and enforcement of civil remedies against terrorism serve and
what institutions within the national government are best situated to cre-
ate and enforce the remedies - the courts, Congress, or the Executive
Branch?" ' Prof. Koh concludes that it is up to the Congress to craft ex-
tensive civil statutory schemes against terrorism.12 Only. in this manner,
can the development of public international litigation be sustained.1"
Other authors have also suggested that private sanctions are vital to
the war against terrorism. " As Prof. Jordan Paust noted, "a realistic ap-
proach to law and choice should not focus on questions of whether there
should be private involvement in decisions about and sanctions against
terrorism, but rather how to make private participation more useful."' 5
Prof. Paust advocates the use of the legislative and court systems to deter
terrorism.'6 McDougal and Feliciano point to military, diplomatic, eco-
nomic, and ideological solutions to terrorism.1 7 Additionally, Prof. Paust
discusses a possible cause of action for terrorist victims against common
carriers.'" More specifically, he states that tort law can be utilized by air-
line passengers to recover damages from airlines for acts committed by
terrorist groups on their planes.' 9
Imposing civil liability against airlines could be perceived as an equi-
table distribution of the risk and a promotion of anti-terrorism efforts.2 0
Thus, the idea of civil suits by the Klinghoffers against the owners of the
Achille Lauro does not seem novel, nor far-fetched.2 In fact, Prof. Paust
supports civil liability whenever individuals or institutions are intention-
ally or negligently involved in an act of terrorism.2 2 For instance, Prof.
Paust cites as an example a gun shop owner supplying illicit dum-dum
9. Id. at 175-77.
10. Id. at 173.
11. Id. at 174.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 15-37 and accompanying text.
15. Paust, Private Measures of Sanction, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERROR-
ISM 578 (Evans and Murphy eds. 1978).
16. Id. at 587, 593-5, 597-9, 607-11.
17. M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 56-57, 62-
63, 102-103, 148-58 (1961).
18. Paust, supra note 15, at 597.
19. Id. at 597-98.
20. Id. at 598.
21. See infra notes 123-250 and accompanying text.
22. Paust, supra note 15, at 598.
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bullets to terrorists who commit violent acts. He argues that such a ven-
dor should be held strictly liable for the damages resulting from the sale
of such an inherently dangerous product.2" Such civil sanctions would
greatly expand the scope of weapons which could be used to combat
terrorism.
2 4
While private causes of action involve non-state actors, strengthened
governmental rules regarding international civil procedure would also as-
sist private suits.2 5 Additionally, more government rules are necessary to
coordinate resolutions of such suits in light of already existing bilateral
and multilateral conventions regarding jurisdiction and choice of law over
the offender.2 6 Such integration and use of established international law
precepts will ultimately enable a victim of terrorism to receive
compensation.
2 7
Several authors suggest that civil causes of actions may already be
brought under existing conventions, such as the European Convention on
the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes (European Convention).
28
Professor Otto Lagodny points out that the European Convention expe-
dites prosecution of terrorist offenders.29 More specifically, it denies ter-
rorists the designation of their violent activities as "political offenses,"
which are excepted from extradition under the European Convention.30
As Article I provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of extradition between Contracting States, none of
the following offences shall be regarded as a political offence or as an
offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by
political motives: ...
c. a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integ-
rity or liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplo-
matic agents;




25. See generally Leanza & Sico, Compensation for Victims of Maritime Terrorism, in
MAiTimE TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-105 (Ronilli ed. 1990); Trotter, Compen-
sating Victims of Terrorism: The Current Framework in the United States, 22 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 383 (1987); Pollock, Terrorism as a Tort in Violation of the Law of Nations, 6 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 235 (1982).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Leanza & Sico, supra note 25, at 103; Lagodny, The European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism: A Substantial Step to Combat Terrorism, 60 COLO. L. REV. 583
(1989). European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan.
27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 [hereinafter ECST]. See also
Explanatory Report on the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Council
of Europe 1977).
29. Lagodny, supra note 28, at 584.
30. Id.
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e. an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic
firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons;
f. an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation
as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such
an offence."'
'
Second, Professors Umberto Leanza and Luigi Sico argue that the
European Convention assists civil remedies in the fight against terror-
ism."2 More particularly, the Convention permits victims to be compen-
sated by the nation where the crime occurred.3 3 While acknowledging
some immunities, Leanza and Sico note that the Convention provides,
"set maximum levels of compensation; specif[ies] damages that may be
claimed; outline[s] procedures for placing claims; and guard[s] against
double compensation.
3 4
Other authors argue that civil remedies against terrorists can be
framed using existing U.S. legislation, namely, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization statute ("RICO").3 5 While the RICO statute
was not designed to curb terrorism, civil RICO permits private treble
damage suits by persons harmed in their property or business against
RICO "enterprises" involved in a "pattern of racketeering."36 RICO stip-
ulates that a "pattern of racketeering" involves the carrying out of several
acts including "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, arson, or
extortion" within a ten-year period.
3 7
There has been some use of the civil RICO statute by U.S. Attorneys'
Offices against terrorist groups.3 s More particularly, the U.S. Attorney Of-
fice for the Southern District of New York utilized civil RICO provisions
to obtain injunctions, curb the actions, and gain the forfeiture of assets of
institutions who support terrorist groups.3 9 In contrast, United States v.
Ivic" ° attempted unsuccessfully to use criminal RICO against alleged ar-
son and murder by Croation terrorists. 41 In Ivic, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that criminal RICO was inapplicable because the alleged offenses
31. ECST, supra note 28, art. 1.
32. Leanza & Sico, supra note 25, at 103.
33. ECST, supra at 28.
34. Leanza & Sico, supra note 25, at 103.
35. Nathan & Juster, Law Enforcement Against International Terrorists: Use of the
RICO Statute, 60 COLo. L. REV. 553 (1989). RICO can be found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
38. Koh, supra note 5, at 175, n. 24.
39. Id. See Summary of Panel on Civil Remedies Against Terrorists and Nations Sup-
porting Terrorists, American Bar Association National Conference on the Law in Relation-
ship to Terrorism (June 6, 1986) (remarks of Carl T. Solberg, Chief of Civil Division, Office
of United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York).
40. 700 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1983).
41. Id.
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were "neither claimed nor shown to have any mercenary motive." '42 Fur-
thermore, in Ivic, the court stated that "RICO's origins, most particularly
of the mischief it was meant to remedy, indicate that political terrorism,
at least when unaccompanied by any financial motive . . . is beyond its
contemplated reach."'
In a subsequent case, United States v. Bagaric," which involved alle-
gations that a Croatian terrorist group was perpetrating an international
extradition scheme, the Second Circuit concluded that RICO required
that the criminal activities be motivated by only some economic or finan-
cial objectives."" Nevertheless, the Bagaric court concluded that terrorist
acts are beyond the reach of RICO.4
6
Given the apparent limitations of RICO to combat terrorism in the
U.S., Irvin Nathan and Kenneth Juster suggest amending RICO in order
to enlarge the predicate offenses list of the statute.' 7 This modification
would allow for sanctioning "(1) hostage taking, (2) assault on foreign or
federal offenses, and (3) assassination of foreign or federal officials.'
8
Furthermore, Nathan and Juster articulate that RICO should be
amended to eliminate the economic/financial motive to the predicate
list.'" If such changes are made to existing law, the authors conclude, the
U.S. will have another tool to fight terrorism. 0
The issue of who in the terrorist organization should be sued must
also be addressed." Although for evidentiary and length of procedure in-
terests it would seem logical to file a civil action against the actual perpe-
trators, such defendants are unlikely to have the financial resources to
adequately compensate the victims. 2 Instead, it is more beneficial to
name the actual terrorist organization and its leaders in the suit; 3 how-
ever, impediments arise in such a scenario as well. 5' For example, since
terrorist organizations are illicit, secret cadres, it is often difficult, if not
impossible, to locate and attach their assets.8
Consideration should also be given to the defenses which can be
claimed by terrorist organizations. 6 As has long been the case, terrorist
42. Id. at 59.
43. Id. at 63.
44. 706 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
45. Id. at 58.
46. Id.








55. Id. at 100.
56. Id. See generally Roberts, The Legal Implications of Treating Terrorists as
Soldiers, 9 CONFLiCT 375 (1989).
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groups view themselves as freedom fighters and, in cases such as the
PLO, as sovereign states.5 7 If the latter is recognized as such an entity,
then the "terrorist" group (and its leaders) could proffer the defense of
sovereign immunity.58 As will be discussed below, most terrorist groups
which claim to be states, do not possess the attributes which define a
state under international law." Terrorists groups could, however, be
ascribed the signification of insurgents under international law.60 Viewing
a terrorist group as an insurgent would similarly provide this extra-legal
organization with the defenses of a sovereign state.
6 1
B. Civil Suits Against Common Carriers
A plaintiff injured in a terrorist incident aboard a common carrier is
more likely to obtain a judgement against the charterer of the carrier or
against the common carrier itself than against a terrorist group.6 2 Na-
tional laws often require that the safety of passengers (and their luggage)
be guaranteed by the common carrier.6 1 Moreover, international agree-
ments, such as article 3 of the 1974 Athens Convention, state that: "[tihe
carrier shall be liable for the damage suffered as a result of the death of
or personal injury to a passenger and the loss of or damage to luggage if
the incident which caused the damage so suffered occurred in the course
of the carriage and was due to the fault or neglect of the carrier, of his
servants or agents acting within the scope of their employment.114 While
the Athens Convention is not yet in force, its basic principles shed light
on both contractual liability and tort culpability of a common carrier.65
For instance, Italian law requires that, to obtain damages, a passenger (in
our analysis, a terrorist victim) need only show that the harm occurred
during the course of the voyage. 6 In contrast, in a tort-based suit, the
carrier's negligence must be demonstrated.6 7 If the negligence standard
must be satisfied in order to recover against the carrier, it would obvi-
ously be more difficult to prevail since it would be hard to show a direct
relationship between the harm caused by the terrorist and the negligence
of the carrier.
6 8
57. Leanza & Sico, supra note 25, at 100.
58. See infra notes 183-190 and accompanying text.
59. Id.
60. Roberts, supra note 56, at 375-88.
61. Leanza & Sico, supra note 25, at 100.
62. Id. at 100.
63. Id. at 101. See arts. 409 and 412 (1), Codice della Navigazione (Italy) cited in Le-
anza & Sico, supra note 25, at 104.
64. Athens Convention of December 13, 1974, art. 3 [hereinafter Athens Convention].
65. Id.; Sico, supra note 25, at 101.
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C. Civil Suits Against Nations and Their Agents
Since it is a state's responsibility to check immigration and security
matters during pre-boarding of maritime vessels, it would appear, at first
glance, that state liability attaches if this duty is not met.6 9 More specifi-
cally, a state could likely be responsible "if the terrorist group was on
board the carrier from the time of embarking, or [at] a port of call where
terrorists boarded the carrier."7 Damages accruing from this state re-
sponsibility can be based on either direct or vicarious liability.7 Yet, us-
ing tort principles, a nation's liability for harms to passengers resulting
from a terrorist attack can accrue solely if the extra-legal attack was rea-
sonably foreseeable.72 Furthermore, sovereign immunity laws and the act
of state doctrine may indeed be a grave impediment to suits against
states by victims of terrorism.
73
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
The Achille Lauro incident brings into clear focus several interna-
tional agreements that could have a useful role in fighting terrorism: The
1958 Convention on the High Seas, the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, and the 1988 Rome Convention for the Suppres-
sion of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation ("I.M.O.
Convention"). 74 Before these international documents can be applied,
however, it is necessary to define the term "piracy," and then to assess
whether the Achille Lauro incident constituted piracy.
75
69. Id. at 101.




74. Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter 1958 Geneva Convention]. 1982 Law of the Sea Con-
vention, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 62/122, art. 101, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261
(1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Law of the Sea Convention]. 1988 Protocol for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located On the Continen-
tal Shelf, International Maritime Organization Doc. SUA/CONF/16/Rev.2, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. 668 (1988).
75. Compare McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implications for International Law,
52 TENN. L. REv. 691, 700 (1985) ("Thus it is evident that the seizure of the Achille Lauro
was piracy jure gentium"); Halberstam, Terrorism On the High Seas: The Achille Lauro
Piracy and the I.M.O. Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 269, 282 (1988)
("While the Achille Lauro incident may bring the hijackers within the definition of piracy, it
might not apply to terrorist acts in different circumstances"); Gooding, Fighting Terrorism
in the 1980's: The Interception of the Achille Lauro Hijackers, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 158, 159
(1987) ("While it may be contended that the taking of the Achille Lauro is not included
within [the 1958 Convention on the High Seas] definition [of piracy] because there was no
second vessel involved or because the hijackers did not act for private ends, customary in-
ternational law and the history of the enforcement of the norm against piracy indicate that
such a position is unfounded"). See also Ronzitti, The Law of the Sea and the Use of Force
Against Terrorist Activities, in MARITIME TERRORISM, supra at 25 ("[T]he Achille Lauro
hijacking cannot be considered as piracy, for two reasons: first, because the two-vessel re-
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Although an ancient crime, an authoritative definition of piracy is
lacking."6 Part of this deficiency is due to arguments over the components
of the crime which include: "[1] whether... an intent to rob, was a neces-
sary element, [2] whether acts by insurgents seeking to overthrow their
government should be exempt, as were acts by state vessels and recog-
nized belligerents, and [3] whether the act had to be by one ship against
another or could be on the same ship.""' Nevertheless, customary interna-
tional law views piracy as a crime."8 More specifically, it encompasses
"every unauthorized act of violence against persons or goods committed
on the open sea either by a private vessel against another vessel or by the
mutinous crew or passengers against their own vessel. '7 9 In contrast,
modern maritime terrorism often involves acts committed on one ship,
and involves political rather than monetary goals.8 0
Under article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress is em-
powered to define and punish acts of piracy." While early federal court
decisions characterized piracy as "robbery and murder on the high seas"
and "depredation on the seas,"8 " later courts have focused on the utility
of sanctioning piracy in order to permit all countries "to navigate [freely]
on the high seas." ' Current legislation requires stringent punishment of a
convicted pirate.8 4 Yet because federal legislation defers its definition of
piracy to international law, international clarification of the elements of
piracy is vital.89
In order to establish a uniform definition of piracy in the law of na-
tions, the 1958 Geneva Convention sculptured a straight-forward descrip-
tion of the crime. 6 The Convention provides that piracy includes any of
quirement is lacking; secondly, because piracy is a crime committed for private ends,
whereas terrorist organizations act for political aims." Note, Towards A New Definition of
Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident, 26 VA. J. INT'L. L. 723, 748 (1986) ("The Palestinians'
actions, however, do not qualify as piracy under international law").
76. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 272-73. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 154
(1928) ("There is no authoritative definition of international piracy").
77. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 272-73.
78. "[Pliracy by the law of nations, in its jurisdictional aspects, is sui generis." S.S.
Lotus, 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7), reprinted in 2 M. HUDSON, WORLD COURT RE-
PORTS 20, 70 (Moore, J., dissenting).
79. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 608-09 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
80. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 277-281.
81. Congress is empowered to "define and punish piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
82. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 155, 158 (1820).
83. United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied,
685 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1114 (1983).
84. "Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of
nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned
for life." 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982). See also 33 U.S.C. § 381 (1982) (discussing President's
right to implement public ships to counter piracy).
85. Id.
86. 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 74, art. 15. Article 101 of the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention has similar provisions on piracy. 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, Dec. 10,
1991
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the following:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any acts of depredation,
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private
ship or private aircraft, and directed: (a) On the high seas, against
another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such
ship or aircraft; (b) Against a ship, aircraft, person or property in a
place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described
in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article.8
Scholars have argued that the language "for private ends" does not
necessarily require an intent to rob.8 8 Yet, questions remained whether
this term "was intended to exclude all acts done for political purposes or
only acts committed by unrecognized insurgents that would be lawful if
committed by recognized belligerents."'89 Answers to these questions seem
to be pronounced in the affirmative by the International Law Commis-
sion's comments on the draft 1958 Geneva Convention.9" More specifi-
cally, the comment concluded that "the draft convention excludes from
its definition of piracy all cases of wrongful attacks on persons or prop-
erty for political ends, whether they are made on behalf of states, or of
recognized belligerent organizations, or of unrecognized revolutionary
bonds." 91
Despite apparent exemption of terrorist acts from the elements of
piracy, Article 16 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas stipulates,
"[tihe provisions of this convention do not diminish a state's right under
international law to take measures for the protection of its nationals, its
ships and its commerce against interference on or over the high seas,
when such measures are not based upon jurisdiction over piracy. '92 The
comments to this article explain that this provision stands for the pro-
position that acts having the characteristics of piracy would be deemed
unlawful if carried out by the unrecognized belligerent, while the same
acts committed by revolutionaries would be legal. 3 More simply, only
when insurgents' piratical activities are aimed at a nation whose govern-
1982, UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, art. 101, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
87. Id.
88. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 278.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Harvard Research in International Law, Comment to the Draft Convention on
Piracy, 26 AM. J. INT'L. L. Supp. 749, 786 (1932) [hereinafter Harvard Research].
92. 1958 Geneva Convention, supra note 74, art. 16. See Halberstam, supra note 75, at
278-79 (discussing implications of art. 16).
93. Harvard Research, supra note 91, at 857; Halberstam supra note 74, at 279 (review-
ing analysis of comments).
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ment they want to replace, will the attack be defined as non-piracy.9 4
Although international law often differentiates between soldiers and
insurgents, an exemption from liability due to an insurgent's arguable pi-
ratical actions hurts the world community's fight against terrorism." Af-
ter all, language by one author describing the insurgent who commits
"piracy" as "not the enemy of the human race, but he is the enemy solely
of a particular state" is preposterous." Such an "escape" enables the ter-
rorist/insurgent to be absolved of his crimes if he is conveniently labeled
an "insurgent."9 After all, Articles 15 and 16 of the 1958 Geneva Conven-
tion provide that the distinguishing characteristic, given the same facts,
between piracy and other crimes depends on whether the activities are for
political ends." Thus, by excluding political acts from this international
criminal designation, the world community is, in essence, approving of
many national liberation movements' crimes.9 Such distinctions in the
1958 Geneva Convention must be reexamined since "personal security of
life and property far outweigh the need for radical groups to prey upon
the innocent."' 0 0
In conclusion, since international law is forever evolving, its meta-
morphosis must include "[an] exemption for insurgents [which] would
not exclude present-day terrorists, since it applied only to insurgents who
confined their attacks to a particular state."'0 ' Furthermore, as Sir Lau-
terpacht explained, "it would not seem improper to describe and treat as
piratical such acts of violence on the high seas which by their ruthlessness
and disregard of the sanctity of human life invite exemplary punishment
and suppression. "102
94. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 279.
95. W. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 234 (1st ed. 1884).
96. See Halberstam, supra note 75, at 279. See generally TERRORISTS OR FREEDOM
FIGHTERS, (E. Tavin and Y. Alexander eds. 1986); Rubin, Terrorism and the Laws of War,
12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 219 (1983); Bouffard, Extradition - Political Offense Excep-
tion - United States Court Creates A New Definition for Use Against International Ter-
rorists, 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 197 (1982).
97. See Halberstam, supra note 75, at 288. "Insurgents who did not confine their at-
tacks to ships and property of the government they sought to overthrow. . . were considered
pirates." Id. See also The Magellan Pirates, 164 Eng. Rep. 47 (1853) (discussing that de-
pending on whom they attack, persons may be considered pirates or insurgents).
98. McCredie, Contemporary Uses of Force Against Terrorism: The United States'
Response to Achille Lauro - Questions of Jurisdiction and Its Exercise, 16 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 435, 448 (1986).
99. Crockett, Toward a Revision of the International Law of Piracy, 26 DE PAUL L.
REV. 78, 87, 92 (1976). See, Green, The Santa Maria: Rebels or Pirates, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 496 (1961); Vali, The Santa Maria Case, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 968 (1961) (providing over-
view of seizure of luxury ship in Caribbean by "pirates"/"rebels" opposing Portuguese
government).
100. McCredie, supra note 98, at 449.
101. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 289.
102. H. LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 307-08 (1968).
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IV. FACTS SURROUNDING THE ACHILLE LAURO INCIDENT: A CASE STUDY
On October 7, 1985, four armed men, allegedly members of the Pales-
tine Liberation Front (PLF), a faction of the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO), seized an Italian registered cruise ship, the Achille Lauro,
in Egyptian territorial waters.103 The PLO hijackers, posing as passengers,
managed to board the vessel without any opposition.'" At the time of the
seizure, approximately one hundred passengers, including twenty-eight
Americans, and a crew of 350 were aboard.
10 5
According to some accounts, the seizure and terrorist activity on the
Achille Lauro, some thirty miles off Port Said, Egypt, was not supposed
to occur.' 6 Instead, the hijackers were part of a team, masterminded by
Mohammed Abu Abbas, who intended to launch an attack in Ashdod,
Israel. 0 7 Apparently, as the terrorists were in their cabin taking stock of
their weapons, other passengers entered their room. Consequently, the
cadre was exposed, and the terrorists then decided to take control of the
ship.
108
Upon securing control of the vessel, the PLO terrorists stated that
they would blow up the Achille Lauro unless the Israeli government re-
leased fifty Palestinians held in Israeli jails.109 Although the terrorists
probably foresaw Israeli nonacquiescence, they nevertheless stressed the
seriousness of their demands. 110 To underscore the ramifications of an Is-
103. Tagliabue, Ship Carrying 400 Seized: Hijackers Demand Release of 50 Palestini-
ans In Israel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, Al, at col. 6. The seizure of the Achille Lauro
occurred while the ship was sailing between two Egyptian cities, Port Said and Alexandria.
The Egyptians could assert jurisdiction over the incident since according to the Law of the
Sea, Egypt has a contiguous zone measuring twenty-four nautical miles from its shores.
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 37 U.N. GAOR Annexes (Agenda
Item 28), U.N. Doc. A/conf.62/122 (1982).
The Palestine Liberation Front is a radical splinter group of the PLO, which broke
away from the umbrella group in 1982. The group is led by Abu Nidal. Bergen, Even With
A Name It's Hard To Know Who The Hijackers Are, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1985, at A9, col. 2.
"Abu Nidal may be the deadliest terrorist alive ... Over the past twelve years [he] has
molded his organization . . . into a fanatical, amorphously structured terrorist band with
between 200 and 500 adherents." Master of Mystery and Murder, TIME, Jan. 13, 1986, at 31.
The PLF is composed of both pro-Arafat and anti-Arafat sections. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10,
1985, § 1, at 7, col. 2.
For an overview of PLF's background and activities, see Y. ALEXANDER & J. SINAI, TER-
RORISM: THE PLO CONNECTION 43, 212-13 (1990) [hereinafter PLO CONNECTION]. For an in-
depth analysis of the PLO's structure, relations with other states, and activities see J.
BECKER, THE PLO: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (1984).
104. The Voyage of the Achille Lauro, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 30-31 [hereinafter TIME].
105. Id.
106. Tagliabue, supra note 103; N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
107. Id.; N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6; McCredie, supra note 98, at 436.
108. McGinley, supra note 75, at 692.
109. Tagliabue, supra note 103, at Al, col. 6; Friedman, Jailed Palestinians: Hundreds
Held, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at A10, col. 1.
110. Prial, Israel Firm on Terror Policy, But Seems Willing to Help, N.Y. Times, Oct.
9, 1985, at AS, col. 1 [hereinafter Israel Policy]; We Are Losing Patience, N.Y. Times, Oct.
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raeli refusal to release the jailed Palestinians, the hijackers brutally mur-
dered an elderly, disabled American, Leon Klinghoffer. 111 This unpro-
voked shooting, and subsequent discard of Mr. Klinghoffer (and
wheelchair) overboard, marked the only fatality during the incident.'1 2
Negotiations attempted to find a resolution to the incident. Partici-
pants in the talks were Abu Abbas of the PLF, Ani el-Hassan, an adviser
to PLO Chairman Arafat, Egyptian authorities, and the hijackers.113 On
October 9, 1985, when the terrorists understood that the Israelis would
not negotiate, and upon obtaining a guarantee of their immediate release,
Egyptian authorities allowed Abbas to remove his comrades and accom-
pany them off the ship."" The terrorists were then taken into custody by
Egyptian authorities, although they were not arrested." 5 The following
day, the Egyptian government claimed that it no longer knew the wherea-
bouts of the Palestinian hijackers."' Despite these assurances by the
Egyptians, various intelligence sources obtained convincing evidence that
the terrorists had boarded an Egypt Air 737 flight to Tunisia." 7 Following
this exposition, the Egyptians argued that the hijackers were sent to Tu-
nisia to stand trial before the National Ruling Council of the PLO."' Ad-
ditionally, the purpose of the proposed transfer from Egyptian to PLO
forces was, according to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, an opportu-
nity for Yasir Arafat to reiterate his denunciation of terrorism." 9
While the aircraft was in flight to Tunisia, President Reagan put
pressure on the Tunisian government, causing the latter to deny the
Egyptian plane the right to land.' More specifically, President Reagan
communicated to Tunisia that "the United States ha[d] reason to believe
... that the hijackers were on board an EgyptAir plane headed for Tunis
[Tunisia] .. .[and][that] the terrorists should not be allowed to land."''
The Tunisians agreed. At the same time, U.S. Navy F-14 fighter planes
9, 1985, at A9, col. 45 [hereinafter Patience].
111. Miller, Hijackers Yield Ship in Egypt; Passenger Slain, 400 Are Safe; U.S. As-
sails Deal With Captors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
112. Id., N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 6. At a 1988 press conference in
Algiers, Algeria, Abu Abbas, jokingly remarked that Mr. Klinghoffer "was trying to swim for
it." Memorial Foundation, infra note 266, at 2.
113. Sacerdofi, States' Agreements With Terrorists in Order to Save Hostages: Non-
Binding, Void or Justified by Necessity?, MARIME TERRORISM, supra note 25, at 25-26.
114. Israel Policy, supra note 110; Gwertzman, State Department Angry At Speedy
Accord With Gunmen, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 3; Schumacher, Arafat Asks
That Gunmen Be Turned Over To PLO, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at All, col. 2.
115. TIME, supra note 104, at 33.
116. Getting Even, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at 22 [hereinafter Getting Even].
117. Id. at 20, 22-23.
118. You Can Feel The Damage, TIME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 26.
119. Kifner, Mubarak, Furious at U.S., Demands a Public Apology, N.Y. Times, Oct.
15, 1985, at A10, col. 1. "If Arafat didn't punish them, then he would be responsible before
the whole world." Id.
120. The U.S. Sends A Message, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 22 [hereinafter U.S. Message].
121. Getting Even, supra note 116, at 24.
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forced the Egyptian aircraft to land at a North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion (NATO) air base in Sigonella, Sicily.12" At the tarmac in Sigonella,
the U.S. Navy tried to obtain custody of the terrorists in order to transfer
them to the U.S. to stand trial. 22 Italian authorities intervened and the
hijackers were ultimately taken into custody by the Italians. 2 " Subse-
quently, the Italian government asserted jurisdiction over the terrorists,
and thus denied a United States request for extradition.125 While some of
the hijackers were awaiting trial in Spolet, Italy, the Italians allowed Ab-
bas to leave by way of Yugoslavia. 2 Following his departure, Italian
prosecutors issued arrest warrants for him. Although three of the thirteen
individuals ultimately indicted in Italy in connection with the hijacking
were given life sentences in absentia, the three other convicted hijackers
were sentenced to 15, 24, and 30 years. 27
V. CIVIL SUITS ARISING OUT OF THE ACHILLE LAURO INCIDENT
A. Klinghoffer Causes of Action Against Various Actors in the Achille
Lauro Incident
The Klinghoffer family has at different periods and in various man-
ners, sued the PLO and other parties based on the Achille Lauro at-
tack.128 More specifically, Mrs. Klinghoffer brought suits on behalf on
herself and her husband in both the Supreme Court of New York and a
federal district court, the Southern District of New York. Following her
death, Mrs. Klinghoffer's daughters maintained these suits in both juris-
dictions on behalf of their parents and in their own privilege.'2 9
122. U.S. Message, supra note 120 at 22; Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying
Hijackers; Fighters Divert It To NATO Base in Italy; Gunmen Face Trial In Slaying of
Hostage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at A10, col. 6. "President Reagan ... ordered the dra-
matic military action after hearing that Egypt had turned down repeated American pleas to
prosecute the four gunmen and was flying them to freedom." Id. (providing quote of Mr.
Larry Speaks, White House spokesman). See McGinley, supra note 75 at 708-713 (discuss-
ing jurisdictional claims of PLO to prosecute Achille Lauro hijackers).
123. Apple, Change In Course, This Time Reagan Let His Actions Do His Thinking,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 4, at 1, col. 2.
124. Id.
125. N.Y. Times, July 11, 1986, at A6, col. 4. See generally Fuller, Extradition of Ter-
rorists: An Executive Solution to the Limitations of the Political Offense Exception in the
Context of Contemporary Judicial Interpretations of American Extradition Law, 11 SuF-
FOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 351 (1988).
126. Tagliabue, Italians Identify 16 in Hijacking of Ship, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1985,
at A3, col. 4; Hijacker To Be Tried As Minor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1985, at A10, col. 3;
Philadelphia Inquirer, Oct. 27, 1985, at 3A, col. 3; See McGinley, supra note 75, at 713-15
(discussing jurisdictional claims of PLO to prosecute Achille Lauro hijackers).
127. Suro, Italian Jury Gives Cruise-Ship Killer 30-Year Sentence, N.Y. Times, July
11, 1986, at Al, col. 4; Suro, Hijacking Verdicts Appealed, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1986, at 3,
col. 1.
128. See infra note 171 and accompanying text. Goldie, Legal Proceedings Arising
From The Achille Lauro Incident in the United States of America, MARITIME TERRORISM,
supra note 25, at 107-27.
129. Goldie, supra note 128, at 107.
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To get a better understanding of the scope of the Klinghoffer v. PLO
litigation, it is important to review the various suits brought against other
actors in the Achille Lauro incident.
130
1. All Klinghoffer Suits Except Those in Which the PLO is a
Defendant
a. Suit by Mrs. Klinghoffer
This suit, filed in November 1985, alleged various grounds for recov-
ery from the travel and transportation actors involved in the Achille
Lauro incident.' More specifically, Mrs. Klinghoffer brought causes of
action against: Commissaria of the Flotta Achille Lauro in Amministra-
zione Straordinara; S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave
Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria (jointly referred to as
"Lauro"); Port of Genoa, Italy ("Genoa"); Club ABC Tours, Inc.
("ABC"); Chandris (Italy) Inc. ("Chandris"); and Crown Travel
Service."3 2
In her complaint, Mrs. Klinghoffer set out the events on the Achille
Lauro.' 33 Moreover, she described in graphic detail the harsh treatment
which she (and other passengers) received.3 Specifically, she claimed
that while on the Achille Lauro she was battered, assaulted, falsely im-
prisoned, and threatened with death.3 9 As a result of this harsh treat-
ment, Mrs. Klinghoffer asserted that she should recover damages arising
from acute pain and mental anguish, humiliation, anxiety, fright, depres-
sion, and the subsequent physical ramifications.3 6
Mrs. Klinghoffer proffered two theories for relief against Lauro, the
owner of the ship. 37 First, due to Lauro's wrongful acts, recklessness, and
negligence, she suffered the aforementioned injuries and damages. 38
More specifically, Mrs. Klinghoffer noted that Lauro had failed to offer
its passengers sufficient security (i.e., it failed to provide a thorough check
and search of passengers, including their passports and belongings, during
initial boarding in Genoa (October 3, 1985) as well as during subsequent
stops)."3 9 Second, Mrs. Klinghoffer alleged that Lauro caused her severe
emotional distress by negligently permitting the terrorists to threaten her
life." 0
130. Id. at 107-27.
131. Id. at 107.
132. No. 85 Civ. 9803 (LLS); Id. at 107-08.
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b. Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer v. Lauro
Pursuant to the Death on High Seas Act,"' Mrs. Klinghoffer, on be-
half of her husband, initiated suit against Lauro." 2 In that litigation she
asserted that her husband's death was a consequence of neglect, wrongful
acts, and recklessness of Lauro."13 In claiming damages, including those to
cover funeral expenses, the plaintiff asserted that during the takeover of
the ship, Mr. Klinghoffer suffered severe emotional distress and physical
pain, particularly when he was shot. Also, Mrs. Klinghoffer claimed recov-
ery based on general maritime survival statutes and maritime wrongful
death legislation."4
c. Mrs. Klinghoffer v. ABC
In this cause of action, Mrs. Klinghoffer insisted that ABC Tours
breached its contractual obligations by failing to provide safe passage on
the Mediterranean cruise." 5 Such wanton behavior, Mrs. Klinghoffer as-
serted, was coupled with negligent security measures.
1 4 6
d. Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer v. ABC
The plaintiff herein alleged that ABC breached its contractual obli-
gations and failed to comply with warranty provisions. 147 As in Mrs.
Klinghoffer's case against ABC, plaintiff asserted that the travel agent
failed to arrange an adequately safe voyage and thereby acted outra-
geously and wantonly. 4 8 Also, a negligence claim was brought stating that
ABC knew or should have comprehended that the cruise had insufficient
security." 9 Lastly, this action rested on the allegation that ABC did not
sufficiently explicate the limited liability asserted on the cruise tickets.' 50
e. Mrs. Klinghoffer v. Chandris
In this suit against the charterer and common carrier of passengers
on the Achille Lauro, Mrs. Klinghoffer stressed that Chandris was negli-
gent in its failure to provide stringent inspection of persons, luggage,
passports, and other security items.' 51 Furthermore, Mrs. Klinghoffer al-
leged that the negligent acts of Chandris were directly responsible for the
emotional distress she suffered.'52
141. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-66 (1982).
142. No. 85 Civ. 9303 (LLS); Goldie, supra note 128, at 109.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. No. 85 Civ. 9303 (LLS); Id. at 109-10.
146. Id.
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152. Id.
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f. Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer v. Chandris
In this cause of action, the Estate of Klinghoffer alleged that the
death of Mr. Klinghoffer occurred as a result of wrongful acts, reckless-
ness, and neglect by Chandris. 15 3 This suit was also based on the Death
on the High Seas Act.'"4
g. Mrs. Klinghoffer v. Port of Genoa, Italy
Mrs. Klinghoffer alleged that the port was negligent in not providing
appropriate security.'55 More emphatically, there was insufficient inspec-
tion of luggage, passports, and passengers when boarding of the Achille
Lauro.' 56 Furthermore, this subpar inspection led to the emotional dis-
tress which the plaintiff suffered.
157
h. Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer v. Port of Genoa, Italy
The Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer as in other causes of action, claimed
recovery pursuant to the Death on the High Seas Act.5 8 Also, the Estate
sought compensation for pain and distress caused by the terrorists.5 9 Ad-
ditionally, the Estate appended claims for recovery claiming wrongful
death, pursuant to general maritime legislation. 60
2. Klinghoffer v. PLO: Suits in the Supreme Court of New York and
Federal District Court (Southern District of New York)
The Estate of Mr. Klinghoffer also sued the PLO pursuant to the
Death on the High Seas Act.'6 ' Several other theories for recovery were
also proffered: (1) recovery pursuant to the wrongful death precept in
New York's Estates Powers & Trusts Law;'"1 (2) maritime wrongful
death, pursuant to general maritime law; 63 (3) a tort claim of assault,
based on the PLO's intentional acts;'" (4) a battery claim; 65 (5) an alle-
gation of false imprisonment; 66 (6) claims of intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress.
6 7
Mrs Klinghoffer asserted similar claims against the PLO, except for
153. Id. at 111.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 112.
.156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 112-13.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Supreme Court of New York, New York County, Civil Action No. 27801/85.
162. New York Estates Powers & Trusts Law §§ 5-4.1 [hereinafter NYEPTL].
163. Goldie, supra note 128, at 114.
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those based on wrongful death. '68
B. Third Party Complaint of Chandris Against the PLO and the Port
of Genoa, Italy
In response to the suits filed against it by the Klinghoffers, Chandris
filed third-party complaints, in which it sought indemnity or contribu-
tion, from the PLO and the Port of Genoa, Italy.1 8 In this third-party
complaint, Chandris sought contribution or indemnity from the PLO,
based on its negligence, intentional conduct, wrongful acts, and
recklessness. 7 '
In classifying the PLO as an unincorporated association, Chandris
further stated that the terrorist organization "conceived, conspired, or-
ganized, authorized and directed its agents, servants, officers, employees
and operatives to willfully, wantonly and maliciously" capture the Achille
Lauro, and subsequently caused Mr. Klinghoffer's death. 71 Additionally,
Chandris proffered that the PLO's activities in the Achille Lauro affair
constituted a crime, an intentional tort, and an activity hostis humani
generis, thereby making the PLO responsible for damages in excess of
$10,000.172
Three jurisdictional prongs were used in this case: 28 U.S.C. section
1331 (providing federal jurisdiction due to federal question), 28 U.S.C.
section 1332 (establishing federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citi-
zenship), and 28 U.S.C. section 1333 (fixing federal jurisdiction due to
admiralty and maritime laws).'7
Lastly, Chandris stated that the Port of Genoa, Italy does not possess
the sovereign immunity defense, and consequently should indemnify or
contribute for its failure to sufficiently inspect the passengers of the
Achille Lauro.'
7'
VI. THE JUNE 1990 ORDER OF THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
IN KLINGHOFFER v. PLO
A. Introduction
Passengers on the Achille Lauro, filed suits in federal district court in
New York, alleging that "the owner and charterer of the Achille Lauro,
travel agencies and various other entities" failed to notify passengers or
thwart the attack. 1 8 Among these suits was one brought by Mrs. Marilyn
168. Goldie, supra note 126, at 114-15.
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Klinghoffer. 76
In the Klinghoffer action, jurisdiction was proffered on several
prongs: the Death of the High Seas Act,1 77 diversity of citizenship, and
state law. 178 In response to the suit, the Crown Service Travel, Inc. and
Chandris, Inc. impleaded the PLO, calling for contribution or indemnifi-
cation for reparations imposed against them based on the passengers'
suits as well as for punitive and compensatory damages for the PLO's
"tortious interference with their businesses.'
7 9
The PLO moved to dismiss the suit. They asserted that: (1) there
was no subject matter jurisdiction because this case presents a nonjusti-
ciable political question; (2) there was no personal jurisdiction over the
PLO; (3) the PLO, assuming that it is an unincorporated association,
lacked the capacity to be sued; and (4) service of process on Mr. Terzi,
PLO Permanent Observer, in New York was insufficient. 80
Judge Stanton, in a pithy ten-page order, denied the PLO's motion
to dismiss. He first ruled that the PLO is not a foreign state, but rather
an unincorporated association. Next, the court concluded that the subject
matter of the case includes tort claims arising from federal admiralty law
and, as a result, the political question doctrine is inapplicable. 8 ' Addi-
tionally, the court determined that section 301 of New York's Civil Prac-
tice Law and Rules (C.P.L.R.) granted it jurisdiction over the PLO, which
according to the statute was "doing business" in the state.'8 2 Further-
more, because "substantial, continuous, and purposeful contacts with
New York could be attached to PLO activity, the exertion of jurisdiction
over the terrorist organization amply accords due process."8 3 The court
denied PLO claims that its U.N. Observer status accorded it diplomatic
immunity under the U.N. Headquarters Agreement.8
Next, since the suit was brought under federal maritime law, federal
law is applicable for substantive issues, rather than the state law of where
the court sits.'8 5 Finally, the court upheld the service of process upon Mr.
Terzi finding that his position in the U.N. classified him as an agent of
the PLO under section 301 of New York C.P.L.R.'8"
176. Id. at 856 n.1. The court noted that upon Mrs. Marilyn Klinghoffer's death, her
daughters lsa Klinghoffer and Lisa Klinghoffer Arbitter, were substituted as plaintiffs. Id.
177. 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 761-767 (1982).
178. See S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 857 (citing various bases of jurisdiction in
Klinghoffer action). "Later, other Achille Lauro passengers filed two actions directly against
the PLO alleging diversity of citizenship jurisdiction." Id.
179. Id. at 857.
180. Id. at 858.
181. Id. at 858-60.
182. Id. at 860-63.
183. Id. at 865.
184. Id. at 863-5.
185. Id. at 865-6.
186. Id. at 867.
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B. The Nature of the PLO
Concerning its classification for litigation, the PLO implored the
court to adopt its self-description as a state.187 More specifically, the PLO
characterized itself as "the nationhood and sovereignty of the Palestinian
people."188 Consequently, the PLO sought designation as a sovereign na-
tion. Nevertheless, the court found the PLO to be an unincorporated as-
sociation.189 Support for this classification was articulated through the ci-
tation of Motta v. Samuel Weiser, Inc.19° and Health Care Equalization
Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y.' 91
More persuasive than the court's finding that the PLO was an unin-
corporated association, however, was the court's finding that the PLO was
not a sovereign state.' 92 The court determined that the PLO lacked the
key elements of nationhood, as articulated by international law. Interna-
tional law requires that a state must be "an entity that has a defined
territory, and a permanent population, under the control of its own gov-
ernment, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal
relations with other such entities."193 Because the PLO does not comport
with the standard definition of a state, for purposes of this litigation, the
PLO was classified as an unincorporated association. 9"
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The court found subject matter jurisdiction on several bases. 9 5 Ad-
miralty jurisdiction was established since the Achille Lauro incident in-
volved torts, including wrongful death, on the high seas. 198 As 28 U.S.C.
section 1333 provides: "district courts shall have original jurisdiction, ex-
clusive of the courts of the States of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases and all other remedies
to which they are otherwise entitled.'19 7 Further support for the court's
187. Id. at 857-8.
188. Id. at 857, (citing Affidavit of attorney for PLO Ramsey Clark sworn to April 27,
1987, 6).
189. Id. at 858.
190. Motta v. Samuel Weiser, Inc., 768 F.2d 481, 485 (1st Cir. 1985)(citing Black's Law
Dictionary 111 (5th Ed. 1979)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1033, 106 S. Ct. 596, 88 L.Ed. 2d 575
(1988). "An unincorporated association is defined as a body of persons acting together and
using certain methods for prosecuting a special purpose or common enterprise." Id.
191. Health Care Equalization Comm. of Iowa Chiropractic Soc'y v. Iowa Medical
Soc'y, 501 F. Supp. 970, 976 (S.D. Iowa 1980), aff'd, 851 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1988).
192. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 858.
193. Id. (citing National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. MIT Stolt Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551,
553 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 201 (1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1081, 109 S. Ct. 1535, 103 L.Ed.2d 840 (1989).
194. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 858.
195. Id. at 158-59.
196. Id. at 859.
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982). Also, the court determined that pursuant to the "savings
to suitors" clause (§ 1333), plaintiff can bring a cause of action for maritime torts in federal
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finding admiralty jurisdiction was provided by American Hawaiian Ven-
tures, Inc. v. M.V.J. Latuharhory98 which noted that "every seizure by
force on the high seas is prima facie piracy, and hence, a maritime
tort."1 9 The court also determined subject matter jurisdiction exists over
the Klinghoffers' suits since the Death on the High Seas Act provides
jurisdiction over causes of actions for wrongful death on the high seas.200
D. The Political Question Doctrine
The PLO also argued that this suit was not justiciable because it in-
volved foreign policy questions which are outside the court's jurisdiction;
such issues, the PLO continued, are best left to other sectors of govern-
ment.2 1 To support this political question argument, the PLO relied
upon Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.2 °2 In Tel-Oren, the D.C. Circuit
dismissed civil suits arising from attacks on civilians by the PLO, other
Palestinian organizations, and Libya.2 0 3 The Tel-Oren court determined
that such suits would require political evaluations of "terrorism's place in
the international order" and therefore must be dismissed. The D.C. Cir-
cuit reasoned that a judgment on the activities of Libya and the PLO
could interfere with U.S. foreign policy, an area exclusively controlled by
the President and Congress.
20 '
However, Judge Stanton distinguished the facts of Tel-Oren from the
Achille Lauro setting, by noting that the potential harmful effects of as-
sessing the justiciability of the Achille Lauro suit were minimal.20 More-
over, Judge Stanton explained that simply because political ramifications
and foreign affairs are involved does not mean that political questions
exist.2 6 In sum, Judge Stanton held that seizure of the Achille Lauro,
resulted in non-political personal and property tort claims. Therefore, the
or state court. Id., citing Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 867 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir.
1989).
198. 257 F.Supp. 622 (D.N.J. 1966).
199. Id. at 627.
200. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 859.
201. Id. The political question precept was well-described in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217, 82 S. Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
202. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S. Ct.
1354, 84 L.Ed.2d 377 (1985). In Tel Oren, 726 F.2d at 775, the suits were brought pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) which provided aliens with jurisdiction over torts committed by
aliens in circumvention of international law or U.S. treaties. See generally International
Terrorism: Beyond the Scope of International Law: Tel-Oren & Libyan Arab Republic, 12
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 505 (1986).
203. 726 F.2d at 823.
204. Id. at 824-25.
205. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 860. "None of those considerations [of those listed
in Tel-Oren] is present here. The PLO has condemned the Achille Lauro seizure and stated
that it was an act of piracy. It was not at war with either Italy or the United States. No
party asserts that the Achille Lauro seizure was legitimate." Id.
206. Id. at 860. To support this argument, Judge Stanton cited Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
at 212, 82 S. Ct. at 710 ("The doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions, not
one of political cases.").
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"policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for
resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive
Branch 07 would not be disturbed.
E. Personal Jurisdiction
The Southern District of New York has stated several times that, in
admiralty claims, personal jurisdiction is set according to state law. Con-
sequently, Judge Stanton explained that New York C.P.L.R. section 301
could legitimately confer personal jurisdiction over the PLO.20 8 Although
no court had specifically applied section 301 to an unincorporated associ-
ation, nonresident individuals doing business in New York had been sub-
jected to jurisdiction under this section by a federal district court.20 9 Ad-
ditionally, New York general associations law permits suits against
unincorporated associations by designation of either its treasurer or presi-
dent.210 This vital precept, in conjunction with reports that New York
C.P.L.R. 301 jurisdiction could be expanded, even to non-corporate de-
fendants "doing business" in New York, lends support to Judge Stanton's
subject matter jurisdiction determination.
21
Judge Stanton set out the relevant legal precedent prior to determin-
ing the applicability of section 301 and whether the PLO was "doing busi-
ness" in the state.21 2 As described in McGowan v. Smith,2 1 3 defendants
who engage in continuous and systematic conduct may be classified as
"doing business" under section 301.21' Furthermore, Andrulonis v.
United States215 illustrated that should a court determine that, under
section 301, a defendant is doing business in New York, suits may arise
on claims whether or not they are connected to the New York activi-
ties. 216 In the present case, the court determined that the PLO's contacts
with New York are constant and substantial.1 7 More specifically, the
court noted that the PLO: owns a building in New York City, utilized
both as an office and residence; maintains bank accounts; has a telephone
listing; owns automobiles; and has employees in Manhattan.218 Such pur-
poseful and significant connections with New York adequately abide with
207. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S. Ct.
2860, 2865-66 (1988). S.N.C. Achille, 739 F.Supp. at 860. Bachrach v. Keaty, 698 F. Supp.
461, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Cutco Industry, Inc. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cir. 1986).
208. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. 861.
209. Id.; See Diskin v. Starck, 538 F. Supp. 877, 880 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
210. Id.; N.Y. Gen. Ass'ns Law § 13 (McKinney 1942 & Supp. 1990).
211. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 862; 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil
Practice 1 301.15, at 3-30 through 31.
212. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F.Supp. at 862.
213. 52 N.Y.2d 268, 437 N.Y.S. 2d 943, 419 N.E.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1981).
214. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 861.
215. 526 F. Supp. 183, 190 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).
216. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 862.
217. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 863.
218. Id.
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the standards set out in section 301.219
F. PLO's Claim of Immunity
The court did not accept the PLO's claims of immunity from suit
due to its position as a U.N. Observer. 220 The PLO's suggestion that its
actions are immune from scrutiny because of section 15 of the U.N.
Headquarters Agreement was rejected. 21 As the court explained, section
15 of the Headquarters Agreement applies only to United Nations mem-
bers; the PLO is not such a member. Also, other immunities and privi-
leges accorded U.N. representatives and their staffs are limited to those
"performed in the exercise of the [PLO's] observer function" not "to
[those] matters completely unrelated to the presence."2"' Consequently,
the PLO's immunity defense was rejected.223
G. Due Process
Regarding due process implications of New York C.P.L.R. section
301, the PLO was deemed to have sufficient contacts with New York.
224
Thus, the causes of action initiated by plaintiffs in New York would not
infringe upon the standard of "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice," the precept enunciated in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.
225
H. Capacity to be Sued
Because these maritime tort suits are based on either admiralty or
diversity jurisdiction, federal maritime statutes, not state legal precepts,
are applicable. 221 Consequently, jurisdiction over the PLO is available
since case law provides that plaintiffs have a cause of action against an
unincorporated association in its own name, despite the lack of provisions
by state law.227 Furthermore, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 17(b) allows
both plaintiffs to initiate suit against the PLO in its own name.22 '
I. Service of Process
The last issue before Judge Stanton was whether Federal Civil Proce-
dure Rule 4 guidelines were followed during service of process on the
219. Id.
220. Id. at 863-64.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 864.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 865.
225. 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).
226. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F. Supp. at 865-66.
227. Id. at 866 (citing Busby v. Electric Utilities Employees Union, 323 U.S. 72, 73-74,
65 S. Ct. 142, 143-44, 89 L.Ed. 78 (1944).
228. S.N.C. AchiUe, 739 F.Supp. at 866 n. 9.
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PLO's agent Mr. Terzi2 " First, Judge Stanton stated that Rule 17(b)(1)
permits the cause of action against the PLO to be designated in its com-
mon name.2 30 Second, Rule 4(d)(3) authorized Mr. Terzi to receive service
process. " 1 Furthermore, federal law stipulates that "service is sufficient
when made upon an individual who stands in such a position as to render
it fair, reasonable, and just to imply the authority on his part to receive
service." ' " Therefore, the court observed, since Mr. Terzi was responsible
for the PLO's extensive New York functions, service upon the PLO com-
plied with Rule 4(d)(3). 33
VII. ANALYSIS OF KLINGHOFFER v. PLO
In the Klinghoffer litigation, Judge Stanton ruled that the Death on
the High Seas Act was an appropriate springboard to obtain subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.234 Yet, complex arguments regarding the role of state law
in Death on the High Seas Act cases demonstrate the need for further
development of the law concerning this issue. 35 Section 7 of the Death on
the High Seas Act provides that "[t]he provisions of any State statute
giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be
affected by this chapter.
2 3 6
Recent cases have ascribed that even if the Death on the High Seas
Act applies, state courts may have concurrent subject matter jurisdic-
tion.2 7 More specifically, in Lowe v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,2 38 the
Southern District of New York determined that, in causes of action in-
volving suits when deaths take place beyond territorial waters, the Death
on the High Seas Act is not the sole jurisdictional statute.3 9 In fact, the
court in Lowe acknowledged that a plaintiff can bring suit based on state
law.2 0 Similarly, in Rairigh v. Erlbeck,24 1 the court determined that fed-
eral and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in wrongful death
suits. 2 2 Support providing states with jurisdiction for wrongful death
suits on the high seas was- provided by a recent U.S. Supreme Court deci-
229. Id. at 866.
230. Id. at 867.
231. Id. at 867 (citing Montclair Elecs., Inc. v. Electra Midland Corp., 326 F. Supp, 839,
842 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) quoting American Football League v. National Football League, 27
F.R.D. 264, 269 (D.Md. 1961)).
232. S.N.C. Achille, 739 F.Supp. at 867. Once again, the Court also cited C.P.L.R. §
301, to emphasize that the PLO was "doing business" in the state. Id..
233. Id.
234. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
235. Goldie, Excurus of the Current State of the Admiralty Law on Wrongful Death in
the United States of America, MARITIME TERRORISM, supra note 25, at 129-37.
236. 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1982).
237. Goldie, supra note 235, at 129.
238. 396 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 488 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
242. Id.
VOL. 19:3
MARITIME TERRORISM AND LEGAL RESPONSES
sion.2' s More specifically, in Morange v. State Marine Lines, Inc.,2" the
Supreme Court of the U.S. concluded that general maritime law acknowl-
edges a cause of action for wrongful death on all navigable waters, includ-
ing a state's territorial and internal waters, and on the high seas.""
Despite the apparent breadth of concurrent jurisdiction, Justice
O'Connor in 1986 reiterated the role of section 7 in the Death on the
High Seas Act."" More particularly, the U.S. Supreme Court advocated
in Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire2 47 that "the language of section 7 and
its legislative history, as well as the congressional purposes underlying
DOHSA, mandate that section 7 be read not as an endorsement of the
application of state wrongful death statutes to the high seas, but rather as
a jurisdictional saving clause.24 8 Viewed in this light, section 7 serves not
to destroy the uniformity of wrongful death remedies on the high seas but
to facilitate the effective and just administration of those remedies. 24 9
This pronouncement supports Judge Stanton's finding of federal jurisdic-
tion pursuant to the Death on the High Seas Act. 50
VIII. U.S. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
A. Introduction
A bill recently considered by Congress, S. 2465, for the first time cre-
ates a civil cause of action for U.S. victims of international terrorist inci-
dents against the perpetrators of this violence. 51 Support for S. 2465 was
fervently expressed by two senators who introduced the bill in April 1990,
Senator Charles E. Grassley and Senator Howell Heflin.2 52 At the Senate
Subcommittee hearing on July 25, 1990, Senator Grassley explained that
the impetus for S. 2465 was the outrage and tragedy faced by families of
American victims of terrorism."2 Namely, Senator Grassley stated:
We must understand that the victims of Pan Am 103, Mr. Klinghof-
fer, and others, were victims because they were Americans; they died
because they were Americans. We must do all we can to assist and
243. 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1970); Goldie, supra note 235, at 130.
244. 398 U.S. 375, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 (1979).
245. Id.
246. DOHSA, supra note 235, at 131-34.
247. 477 U.S. 207, 91 L.Ed.2d. 174, 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986).
248. Id. at 231-32.
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
251. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, 136 CONG. REC., Apr. 19, 1990, No. 43, at 54592.
252. Hearing On The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, (S. 2465), Senate Judiciary Subcom-
mittee On Courts and Administrative Practice, July 25, 1990 (statement of Sen. Charles E.
Grassley) [hereinafter Grassley]; Hearing On The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, July 25, 1990
(statement of Sen. Howell Heflin) [hereinafter Heflin]. The bill was co-sponsored by 13 sen-
ators including: Sen. Hatch, Sen. Humphrey, Sen. Biden, Sen. Specter, Sen. Simon, Sen.
Levin, Sen. Lieberman, Sen. Murkowski, Sen. Deconcini, Sen. Coats, Sen. Boschwitz, Sen.
Metzenbaum, and Sen. Helms. Grassley, supra note 252, at 2.
253. Grassley, supra note 252, at 2.
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comfort the family of American victims. And it also seems to me that




While acknowledging that United States law, including 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 2331 (1988), allows for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction for acts
of international terrorism, Senator Grassley pointed out that legislation
providing comparable civil remedies do not exist.2"' The Senator con-
cluded by stating that S. 2465 would provide a legislative tool by which
American victims of terrorist incidents could have a cause of action
against their attackers.
2 56
[S. 2465] sends a strong and clear message to the world on how the
American legal system deals-with terrorists .... S. 2465 empowers the
victims of terrorism to seek justice. It. gives them the right to have
their day in court to prove who is responsible for all the world to see.
S. 2465 is clear, express and equivocal: this legislation reaffirms our
commitment to the rule of law. With this law, the people of the
United States will be able to bring terrorists to justice the "American
Way." By using the framework of our legal system to seek justice
against those who follow no framework and defy all notions of moral-
ity and justice.2
5 7
Additionally, Senator Grassley agreed with the June 7, 1990, court
order in Klinghoffer v. PLO in which Judge Stanton held that the Ameri-
can judicial system has personal jurisdiction over the PLO.2 5 8 While not-
ing that this case is a landmark event, the Senator declared his concern
that Klinghoffer might not be followed.2 59 Subsequently, Senator Grassley
opined that federal legislation, particularly S. 2465, was the only manner
in which to empower Americans with litigate responses to terrorism.2 ' 0 In
this way, "a strong warning to terrorists [is sent] to keep their hands off
Americans and an eye on their assets!" ''
Senator Heflin, co-sponsor of the bill, similarly stated his support for
S. 2465.262 Pointing to the past decade of American victimization by in-
ternational terrorists, Senator Heflin pronounced that U.S. criminal sanc-
tions must be complemented with civil remedies.2 6 Consequently, Sena-
tor Heflin claimed that by amending 18 U.S.C. section 2331, S. 2465




257. Id. at 3.
258. Id. at 2.
259. Id. at 2-3.
260. Id. at 3.
261. Id.
262. Heflin, supra note 252, at 2.
263. Id. at 1.
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courts, for injuries sustained during a terrorist act. 6 " Only in this man-
ner, Senator Heflin added, can victims of terrorism obtain some monetary
compensation for their physical and mental injuries.2
65
B. Comments on S. 2465 Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practices
1. Terrorist Victims' Families
Adding some pathos and personal experience to the terrorism debate,
family members of victims of international terrorist activities were pro-
vided with a forum to express their views on S. 2465.266 The first panel
included Lisa Klinghoffer, daughter of Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer, vic-
tims of the Achille Lauro incident. 67 Speaking on behalf of the Leon and
Marilyn Memorial Foundation of the Anti-Defamation League, Ms.
Klinghoffer stated that S. 2465 serves both symbolic and practical pur-
poses.2 68 On a global arena, the bill would support criminal sanctions for
international terrorist acts against U.S. citizens, while at the same time,
send a clear signal that Americans will not tolerate being the victims of
terrorism.266 Additionally, the bill would exhibit the legislature's commit-
ment to fighting terrorism.17 0 On a practical level, the bill would provide
U.S. plaintiffs with clear statutory solutions.
2 71
Ms. Klinghoffer reviewed the difficulties which her family had in fil-
ing suit against the PLO. 7 2 Since U.S. statutes did not provide an ex-
plicit civil cause of action against terrorists, the Klinghoffers were forced
to litigate numerous procedural issues.272 The Klinghoffers finally ob-
tained a ruling allowing for jurisdiction over the terrorist group, but only
after much difficulty. 74 The aforementioned bill would cure present defi-
ciencies in U.S. law by also allowing civil suits against state-sponsors of
terrorism.2 75 Additionally, the bill would provide recovery of treble dam-
ages as well as permit the recovery of attorney fees.
2 76
The next family member of a victim of terrorism to testify on S. 2465
264. Id.
265. Id. at 2.
266. Hearings on The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Senate Judiciary Committee, Sub-
committee on Courts and Administrative Practice, July 25, 1990, (statement of the Leon
and Marilyn Klinghoffer Memorial Foundation of the Anti-Defamation League) [hereinafter
Memorial Foundation]; Statement of Rosemary Wolfe, [hereinafter Wolfe]; and Statement
of Paul S. Hudson [hereinafter Hudson].
267. Memorial Foundation, supra, note 266, at 1.
268. Id. at 1-2.
269. Id. at 2.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 2.
273. Id. at 4.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 4.
276. Id.
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was Rosemary Wolfe. 2 77 Ms. Wolfe was the stepmother of Miriam Wolfe,
a twenty-year-old college student who was one of the 269 passengers
aboard Pan Am 103 when it blew up over Scotland in 1988.78 In Ms.
Wolfe's view, prosecution and punishment of terrorists and their state-
sponsors are often not pursued by the U.S. government for political rea-
sons.27 9 For instance, Ms. Wolfe noted that although the "smoking gun"
from Pan Am 103 can be traced to both the government of Iran and Ah-
med Jibril, it is a lack of political resolve which prevents these terrorist
perpetrators from being brought to justice. 80 The lack of faith in the U.S.
government's will to adequately punish terrorists led her to conclude that
"[flamilies of the victims of terrorism need . . . civil recourse in the
courts. For this may be our only recourse. "281
Another group representing the families of victims of Pan Am 103
described their support for S. 2465.282 Mr. Paul Hudson testified on be-
half of the families and noted that S. 2465 would empower victims of
terrorism and break down the shields which have protected terrorists
from U.S. civil justice. s Furthermore, Mr. Hudson stressed his concern
that the U.S. government should act as co-plaintiff in civil litigation
against terrorists, although control of the suit should remain with the vic-
tims' families.284 Without the strict support of this legislation, as well as
U.S. government approval, subsequent suits against extra-legal force
could yield "tragedy as well as frustration.1
285
2. Department of State
The Department of State's position on S. 2465 was presented by Mr.
Alan J. Kreczko, Deputy Legal Advisor.28 8 Mr. Kreczko noted that the
benefits of the Grassley-Heflin bill are manifold.2 8 7 First, the legislation
will give victims of terrorism civil remedies in U.S. courts, and present
277. Wolfe, supra at 266.
278. Id. at 1.
279. Id. at 2-3.
280. Id. "Mr. Sofaer, legal adviser to the Secretary of State from June of 1985 until last
month, acknowledges that Iran had responsibility in the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lock-
erbie on December 21, 1988. Yet, for the past year and a half our government has refused to
point the finger of blame. The madmen who murdered our precious children and all our love
ones, including my stepdaughter Miriam Wolfe, go free and unpunished. In the process, we
refuse to deal with Iran's involvement. Can Iran's involvement in the bombing of Pan Am
103 be acknowledged by U.S. officials only once they have resigned?" Letter to the Editor,
Wolfe, Denying Iran's Role in Pan Am Flight 103, Wash. Post, July 13, 1990, at A20.
281. Wolfe, supra note 266, at 3.
282. See Hudson, supra note 266.
283. Id. at 1.
284. Id. at 2.
285. Id.
286. Hearing on the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcom-
mittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, July 25, 1990, Alan J. Kreczko, Deputy Legal
Advisor [hereinafter Kreczko].
287. Id. at 5.
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disincentives for terrorists. "8 Consequently the breadth of statutory tools
against terrorism would be augmented. Second, the potential of civil lia-
bility and asset confiscation could deter terrorist groups from both solicit-
ing and maintaining assets in the U.S." 9 Third, the Grassley-Heflin bill
could be mimicked by other national legislatures, thereby expanding in-
ternational resolve against terrorism.2 90 Fourth, this civil cause of action
could be pursued in instances when criminal prosecution, due to a higher
evidentiary standard, would be precluded. 9'
While acknowledging general support for this legislation, Mr.
Kreczko asserted that further revisions were needed before the State De-
partment could fully support the bill." More specifically, Mr. Kreczko
expressed his doubts about the practicability of the legislation, since he
believes that few terrorists could be caught travelling to the U.S. or hold-
ing assets in U.S. based banks. " 3
The major concerns, as expressed by Mr. Kreczko, are credible and
weighty."" Serious concern exists regarding the possibility that the
Grassley-Heflin bill would be used in suits against sovereign nations and
their officials.2 9 5 Thus, the State Department favored the addition of a
provision, section 2336(b), which would prohibit the bill from applying to
foreign states, defined under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act as
well as "any offices or employees thereof." '29 6 The State Department's ra-
tionale was several fold.2 97 Most obviously, the feasibility of civil suits in
U.S. courts against foreign countries or officials, based on their alleged
terrorist acts, could generate severe terrorism against U.S. interests, in-
cluding U.S. allies.2 8 A pronouncement by U.S. courts over foreign states
would be highly disfavored by a majority, if not all, of the foreign
states. 9 9 Moreover, Mr. Kreczko argued that such jurisdiction is violative
of the international principle of sovereign immunity recognized by U.S.
law."'0 He similarly argued that a provision must be placed in the
Grassley-Heflin bill which would prevent plaintiffs from skirting through
suits against foreign government officials."0 '
Another argument voiced against a change in the sovereign immunity
precept vis-a-vis the Grassley-Heflin bill stems from the reciprocity of
288. Id.
289. Id. at 5-6.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 5-6.
293. Id. at 6.
294. See infra notes 295-307 and accompanying text.
295. Id. at 6.
296. Id.




301. Id. at 7-8.
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other legislation. 02 For instance, foreign countries, or their citizens, as
defendants to potential S. 2465 claims could respond with reciprocal stat-
utory schemes which would ultimately serve to label the U.S. or its citi-
zens as terrorists 03 Another drawback to allowing civil suits in U.S.
courts against nations or their officials charged with being terrorists is
that such strategic and highly sensitive positions should be articulated by
the U.S. government, rather than by private individuals.
3 0 4
Finally, Mr. Kreczko explained the State Department's uneasiness
with the possibility that frivolous and gadfly suits could arise based on
alleged terrorist activities by foreign officials and their governments.30 5
For instance, this tool could be utilized by dissident groups and others to
gain publicity while at the same time harming U.S. relations with other
governments." 6 Also, numerous lengthy suits initiated against foreign
governments and their officials could ultimately cause a severe financial
strains on them." 7
3. Department of Justice
The Department of Justice ("DOJ") also provided its view on S.
2465.08 Mr. Steven R. Valentine, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Division, explained that the DOJ generally supported S. 2465's de-
sign to redress harms to Americans caused by terrorists through civil liti-
gation.80 9 Yet he stated that the DOJ also had reservations concerning
several provisions of the Grassley-Heflin bill.310 This apprehension dealt
with those suits that could result in conflicts between civil actions by pri-
vate citizens and the law enforcement efforts of the United States.3 '
The DOJ feared that civil suits proposed under 18 U.S.C. section
2333 of the bill would obstruct criminal litigation." 2 Civil suits under the
bill would involve the testimony of vital government witnesses who could
compromise ongoing investigations or prosecutions. 3 Moreover, during
discovery proceedings, delicate information could be exposed, and prose-
302. Id. at 8.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 8-9.
305. Id. at 9.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Hearings on the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Senate Judiciary Committee, Sub-
committee on Courts and Administrative Practice, Steven Valentine, Deputy Assistant At-
torney General, Civil Division, July 25, 1990 [hereinafter Valentine].
309. Id. "We support the major concepts embodied in S. 2465. The Department [of
Justice] supports legislation to provide a new civil remedy against terrorists and a federal
forum for the families and relatives of victims to pursue claims for compensatory damages.
Such a cause of action will assist in compensating victims, and have a deterrent effect on the
commission of acts of international terrorism against Americans." Id. at. 6.
310. Id. at 7.
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cutors would be forced to reply to time consuming civil discovery re-
quests. 1' Thus, the DOJ proposed that a provision be included in the bill
to allow "the Attorney General to certify that discovery of the govern-
ment's criminal investigative file in a terrorist incident ... will compro-
mise the criminal investigation or national security interests. 3 1 5 Such a
certification would be forwarded to the court where the civil suit would be
pending and thus preclude the discovery of such information.
16
Further safeguards proposed by the DOJ include amendments which
would insure that, if a civil cause of action interferes with national secur-
ity interests or a returned indictment concerning the same amendment as
the civil action, "the Attorney General can, upon good cause shown, re-
quest the court were [sic] the civil litigation is pending to stay that litiga-
tion until completion of the criminal proceedings or the elimination of the
predicate national security interest concern. 31 7 The DOJ also recom-
mended that the Attorney General should have the authority to serve
complaints and summons in civil suits.318 Potential detriment could re-
sult, however, since the Attorney General's participation in civil suits
would be limited. A stay of civil litigation would not exclude the com-
mencement of a lawsuit within the statute of limitation period proposed
in 18 U.S.C. section 2335.319 Additionally, a stay of the civil suit would
actually assist the U.S. plaintiff because he could take advantage of pro-
posed estoppel terms of 18 U.S.C. section 2333(b).320
Furthermore, the DOJ echoed the State Department's position that
the bill should neither apply to governments nor their officials. 33 ' The
DOJ also stated that S. 2465 provisions which permit jurisdiction against
foreign nation's officials to sue derivatively for acts of the foreign state
must be modified. The DOJ also shares the State Department's concern
about the potential for reciprocal action by other nations." 2
The DOJ proposed two other minor additions. First, it recommended
that district courts should have original and exclusive jurisdiction in suits
falling under 18 U.S.C. section 2333.'"s Second, it proposed to modify 18
U.S.C. section 2333 to permit the decedents, survivors, and heirs of ter-




317. Id. at 8.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 9.
321. Id. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act limits federal court jurisdiction against
foreign countries, based on tort damages, only if they arise from "personal injury, or death..
occurring in the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1988).
322. Valentine, supra note 308, at 9.
323. Id. at 10.
324. Id.
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4. Academic Testimony
Further comments on S. 2465 were provided by Professor Wendy
Perdue of Georgetown University Law Center. 25 Prof. Perdue's com-
ments centered on jurisdictional issues. 26 This technical advice focused
on defendants in litigation, venue, and forum non conveniens.3s2  Prof.
Perdue noted that recovery of damages from terrorists will be related to
the scope of reachable assets in the United States.32 8 She stated that if a
reasonable recovery is envisioned, liability must reach "foreign govern-
ments or government run enterprises that engage in or support terror-
ism," rather than just the individual terrorist perpetrators.3 29 Prof. Per-
due acknowledged that such a scenario would require modifications to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
3
Prof. Perdue further remarked that suits could be brought, inter alia,
where "all plaintiffs reside. '331 Since a provision could result in duplicate
cases being tried separately, Prof. Perdue recommended that a preferable
venue scheme would be "where any plaintiff resides. ' 3 2 Similarly, she
found fault in the bill's language that "[venue is proper where] the de-
fendant resides, is found, or has an agent. 3 3 3 She suggested that jurisdic-
tion should be defined as the place "where any defendant resides or is
found."33 4 Prof. Perdue explained that there is a lack of clarity in the
language relating to where the terrorist would be served with process.3 5
Furthermore, she suggested that the service of process provision would be
amended to read as follows: Proper service exists in any district where the
defendant resides, is found, or has an agent.3 36 Finally, Prof. Perdue
stated that the forum non conviens provision, section 2334(c), would re-
vise the confusing alternative forum guidelines ("mere convenient or
more appropriate") to the standards proffered in Gulf Oil Corp. v.
325. Hearing on the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcom-
mittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, Professor Wendy Perdue, July 25, 1990.
326. Id. at 6-8.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 6.
329. Id. at 7.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 8. "Suppose, for example, a passenger from New York and one from New
Jersey are both injured in the same hijacking incident. It would seem sensible and efficient
for these two passengers to join together in one suit and if they did join into one suit there
is no reason why they should not be able to sue in either New York or New Jersey but only
where "the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent." This means that if the defendant
were not in the United States then it would be impossible for the New Jersey and New York
passengers to join together in one suit because there would be no place where venue was
proper."
333. Id.
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Gilbert."'7
C. S. 2465 as Passed in October 1990
On October 1, 1990, the Senate unanimously passed the revised ver-
sion of S. 2465, discussed on July 25, 1990, at the Senate Subcommittee
on Courts and Administrative Practice. 38 The bill was passed as an
amendment to the Military Construction Appropriations Bill.3 9
As the preamble to S. 2465 indicates, the bill "provide[s] a new civil
cause of action in federal law for international terrorism that provides
extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist acts abroad against United
States nationals. 3 4 0 The bill supplements existing legislation which ex-
tends criminal sanctions to international terrorist activities.3 4 1 Specifi-
cally, proposed 18 U.S.C. section 2333(a), would permit U.S. nationals, or
their estates, survivors, or heirs, whose person, business, or property has
been hurt due to an international terrorist incident, to sue in federal dis-
trict court and obtain treble damages, as well as the cost of the litigation,
in conjunction with attorney's fees. 2 Moreover, special maritime or terri-
torial jurisdiction is provided through 18 U.S.C. section 2334(b). 3"3
The bill provides that proper venue over potential defendants is
"where any plaintiff resides or where any defendant resides or is served,
or has an agent. 3 4 4 The bill also states that service of process may occur
"where the defendant resides, is found, or has an agent. 3 45 Witnesses in a
18 U.S.C. section 2333(a) cause of action could also be served in the same
procedure as the defendant. 6 These broad provisions would substan-
tially ease prospective plaintiff's jurisdictional and venue problems.4
Moreover, said provisions address Prof. Perdue's concerns with the am-
biguous language of early versions of the Grassley-Heflin bill regarding
service of process.34 '
337. Id. at 10; Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed.2d
1055 (1947).
338. See Press Release, Sen. Grassley, "Grassley Anti-Terrorism Bill Clears Senate,"
Oct. 2, 1990 [hereinafter Press Release]; Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral to Rep. Bill Lowery (Oct. 17, 1990) at 1-2 [hereinafter Rawls]; Letter from Richard G.
Darman, Director, Office of Management and Budget to Rep. Silvio Conte (Oct. 12, 1990) at
2 [hereinafter Darman].
339. Id.
340. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, S. 2465, as passed Senate, Oct. 1, 1990, preamble.
Obtained from Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Prac-
tice [hereinafter Antiterrorism Act].
341. See supra notes 255, 263 and accompanying text.





347. Once venue difficulties are lessened, fewer obstacles will exist to U.S. nationals
who sue terrorists in the U.S. as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990 would have provided.
348. See supra notes 335-67, and accompanying text.
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Prof. Perdue's misgivings relating to forum non conveniens also ap-
pears to have been addressed by proposed section 2334(d).149 For in-
stance, this provision would provide that a court not dismiss a section
2333 action merely because a plaintiff chose an inappropriate or inconve-
nient forum.350 However, if the court determines that three thresholds
have been met, then dismissal is proper. 8 1 The circumstances which jus-
tify expulsion of the suit include: "(1) The action may be maintained in a
foreign court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over all the
defendants; (2) the foreign court is significantly more convenient and ap-
propriate; and (3) [the] foreign court offers a remedy which is substan-
tially the same as the one available in the courts of the United States.
352
It is necessary to note that proposed sections 2334(d)(1)-(3) are drafted in
a highly pro-plaintiff, anti-case dismissal approach. A case in point is pre-
sent under section 2334(d)(3)'s language that would not permit dismissal
unless the plaintiff could obtain similar remedies elsewhere. 353 At the
same time, it is unlikely that U.S. nationals could receive civil damages
for acts of international terrorism committed against them, their property
or business.3 5 4 Additional ammunition to a plaintiffs cause of action is
available under 18 U.S.C. section 2333(a). That provision prevents a de-
fendant from disclaiming culpability relating to essential elements of a
criminal charge, once he has been found guilty in a criminal proceed-
ing."' This benefits plaintiffs by using criminal actions to strengthen civil
suits.356
The revised Senate bill tried to sooth some of the concerns regarding
possible foreign reciprocal legislation as well as foreign sovereign immu-
nity.35  For instance, in order to quell fears that S. 2465 would be utilized
by some parties with suits alleging "war crimes," proposed 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 2337 did not permit proposed suits "for injury by reason of an act of
war." ' Also to avoid potential difficult foreign policy concerns in suits
against the U.S. government, its officials, foreign governments and its of-
ficers, proposed section 2337 provides a blanket provision denying suits
against government officials.3 5 9 It provides in pertinent part:
No action shall be maintained . . . against (1) the United States, or an
349. See supra note 338 and accompanying text; Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 340, §
2334(d).
350. Antiterrorism Act, supra note 340, §§ 2333, 2334(d).
351. Id.
352. Id. § 2334(d).
353. Id. § 2334(d)(3).
354. See supra notes 302-3 and accompanying text. Since the Department of State
fears that the U.S. (or its officials) will be sued under reciprocal legislation, and such an
existing foreign law was not cited, it is presumed that they do not exist.
355. Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 340, § 2333(a).
356. Id.
357. See supra notes 302-3, 321-2, 354 and accompanying text.
358. Id.; Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 340, § 2337.
359. Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 340, § 2337.
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officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting
within his official capacity or under color of legal authority; or (2) a
foreign state, an agency of a foreign state, or an officer or employee of
a foreign state or an agency thereof acting within his official capacity
or under color of legal authority.360
Notwithstanding the fact that the Bush Administration agreed with
the basic thrust of the Grassley-Heflin bill in October 1990, it repeated
concerns expressed by the Department of Justice and Department of
State officials."6 ' After S. 2465 was incorporated into the Military Con-
struction Appropriations Act, the Department of Justice reiterated its op-
position to the proposed anti-terrorism legislation..
3 6 2
These sentiments were expressed by Assistant Attorney General
Rawls, reaffirming Deputy Assistant Attorney Valentine's testimony in
calling for a provision in the bill permitting the Attorney General certifi-
cate to preempt discovery of prosecution files on terrorist incidents when
disclosure would compromise an investigation. 63 Furthermore, the Assis-
tant Attorney General Rawls suggested adding a provision permitting the
Attorney General, upon good cause, to request a judge to delay a civil suit
until the summation of the criminal case. 6 4 Indeed, such a stay would be
requested only when the criminal case is based on the same terrorist inci-
dent as the civil suit.
3 65
The House of Representatives version of S. 2465 was introduced by
Rep. Feighan and Rep. Hyde.6 6 Due to sharp objections by Rep. Brooks,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, "the Anti-Terrorism Act of
1990" was abandoned in committee. 37 Despite this defeat and some
shortcomings,368 another legislative measure, encompassing similar com-
ponents of S. 2465, will likely be introduced in the next Congress. 6 9
IX. RECENT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO MARITIME TERRORISM
Following the grave attack of the Achille Lauro, governmental discus-
sions commenced to establish another response to international terrorism,
an agreement on maritime terrorism.370 Rather than mimicking the defi-
360. Id.
361. See Rawls, supra at 339; Farman, supra at 339.
362. Rawls, supra note 339, at 1-2.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 2.
365. Id.
366. Undated and untitled synopsis of status of S. 2465 and House of Representatives
version of The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990. Obtained from Senate Judiciary Committee,
Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice:
367. Id.
368. For strengths and weaknesses of legislation see supra notes 251-360 and accompa-
nying text.
369. Telephone interview with Diane Cohen, Minority Counsel, Senate Judiciary
Comm., Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice (Oct. 17, 1990).
370. Treves, The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
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nitional focus of piracy in the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 Law
of the Sea Convention, the I.M.O. Convention outlined the arena in which
states should have jurisdiction."' The I.M.O. Convention also outlined
the activities that individual states had to sanction,3 72 and provided the
rule that required states, upon finding a maritime offender, to either
prosecute or extradite.
3 73
The preamble to the I.M.O. Convention stipulates that the document
is drafted in order "to develop international cooperation between States
in devising and adopting effective and practical measures for the preven-
tion of all unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation, and
the prosecution and punishment of their perpetrators.""7 " Article 3 of the
I.M.O. Convention sets out the offenses by first describing the substantive
offense and then establishing a secondary list which includes threatening,
attempting, and being an accomplice or an abettor to the defined of-
fenses.3 75 Article 3 of the I.M.O. Convention states:
1. Any person commits an offence if that person unlawfully and
intentionally:
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat
thereof or any other form of intimidation; or
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if
that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(c) destroy a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo which
is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatso-
ever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that ship, or
cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational facilities
or seriously interferes with their operation, if any such act is likely to
endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or
(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission
or the attempted commission of any of the offenses set forth in sub-
paragraphs (a) to (f).376
Article 3, paragraph 1, subparagraph g, would apply to the Achille
Lauro case, in light of the brutal murder of Mr. Klinghoffer. Such an
Safety of Maritime Navigation, MARITIME TERRORISM, supra note 25, at 69-90; Halberstam,
supra note 75, at 270.
371. I.M.O. Convention, supra at 75.
372. Id.; Treves, supra note 370, at 70-1.
373. Treves, supra note 370, at 79.
374. I.M.O. Convention, supra note 75, at preamble.
375. Id. art. 3.
376. Id.
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international legal framework to fight maritime terrorism is indeed
important.
With reference to the location of the ship during a terrorist attack,
article 4 provides that the I.M.O. Convention is triggered "(1) if the ship
is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters be-
yond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, or the lateral
limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States .. . [or] (2) when the
offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of a State party
other than the State referred to in [the earlier portion of the sen-
tence]." 3" Thus, the international nature of a voyage, as well as its direc-
tion pursuant to article 4 of the I.M.O. Convention, is established by the
overall itinerary of its voyage.3 78 Additionally, paragraph 2 provides that
an alleged criminal is located on a vessel which is "navigating (or is
scheduled to navigate) at the time the offence was committed. 3 79
Another pertinent article of the I.M.O. Convention is article 6, which
outlines when a state has jurisdiction over the offender. This Article
provides:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over the offences set forth in article 3 when
the offence was committed:
(a) against or on board a ship flying the flag of the State at the
time the offence is committed; or
(b) in the territory of that State, including its territorial sea; or
(c) by a national of that State.
2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such of-
fence when:
(a) it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence
is in that State; or
(b) during its commission a national of that State is seized,
threatened, injured or killed; or
(c) it is committed in an attempt to compel that State to do or
abstain from doing any act.38 0
Article 6 of the I.M.O. Convention provides use of several of the five
bases of jurisdiction available in international law, namely: nationality,
("determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality of the offence");
territoriality ("determining jurisdiction by reference to the place where
the offence is committed"); protective principle ("determining jurisdic-
tion by reference to the national interest injured by the offence"); passive
personality ("determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or
national character of the person injured by the offence"); and universality
377. Id. art. 4; Treves, supra note 370, at 73-4.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. I.M.O. Convention, supra note 75, art. 6.
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principle ("determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the
person committing the offence")."" In article 6, paragraphs 1(a) through
(b) and 2(a), it appears that the territoriality principle is cited. In con-
trast, it seems that the nationality concept is enunciated in article 6, par-
agraph 1(c). Also, in article 6, paragraph 2(b) the passive personality pre-
cept is utilized. Lastly, in article 6, paragraph 2(c), the protective
principle is implemented." ' It must be remembered that the crime of
piracy, although not mentioned by the I.M.O. Convention, is viewed by
most nations as affording universal jurisdiction.38
Turning again to the Klinghoffer case, under article 6, paragraph
2(b), the U.S. would have jurisdiction over the Achille Lauro3 84 Thus, the
I.M.O. Convention greatly strengthens government responses to maritime
terrorism by providing a means for criminal prosecution of the perpetra-
tors of such acts. 8 '
Also, article 8 of the I.M.O. Convention deals with the obligation or
authorization of a nation to establish jurisdiction over an incident.388 Ar-
ticle 8 provides that "[t]he master of the ship of a State Party (the "flag
State" may deliver to the authorities of any other State Party (the "re-
ceiving State") any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has
committed one of the offenses set forth in article 3. ' 387 Despite hortatory
language, this provision codifies the requirement that alleged offenders be
handed over to proper authorities for prosecution. Furthermore, article 8
describes that refusal to accept delivery of the offender must be explained
in full by either the flag nation or receiving nation. 388
As in article 7 of the Hague Convention on Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft and the Montreal Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, article 10 provides that a State in which an offender is found
must either extradite him or immediately initiate prosecution." As a re-
sult, the obligations of a state signatory to the I.M.O. Convention would
be to either commence criminal proceedings against a terrorist offender or
extradite to a nation which would prosecute. If the I.M.O. Convention
would have been in force at the time of the Achille Lauro incident, and
had Egypt been a signatory, then Egypt's obligations under international
law would have been strictly set out.3890 Keeping in line with the provi-
sions of article 10, article 11 states that extradition can occur either with
or without an extradition treaty. 8 '
381. Halberstam, supra note 75, at 296 n. 12.
382. Id.
383. See generally McCredie, supra note 98, at 443-5.
384. I.M.O. Convention, supra note 75, art. 6.
385. See generally id.
386. Id. art. 8; Treves, supra note 370, at 81.
387. I.M.O. Convention, supra note 75, art. 6.
388. Id.
389. Treves, supra note 370, at 81-2.
390. I.M.O. Convention, supra note 75, art. 11.
391. Id.
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In sum, the I.M.O. Convention is a vital and necessary step that the
world community has taken to demonstrate its resolve against terrorism.
X. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion and analysis leads to several conclusions.
First, the increasing role of civil litigation to respond to terrorism is both
real and vital. As the Klinghoffer litigation illustrates, terrorist groups'
accountability can be set forth effectively through the civil courts. Sec-
ond, U.S. legislative proposals, such as S. 2465, will certainly strengthen
the legal tools available to the victims of terrorism. Third, multilateral
legal instruments such as the I.M.O. Convention, are additional guide-
lines which can be used to combat terrorism. In sum, national and multi-
lateral legislation, rooted at decreasing the specter of terrorism, must con-
tinue to flourish in the 1990's. Otherwise, the perpetrators of extra-legal
violence will continue to carry out their destructive activities, and thereby
threaten the fabric of modern society.

